

1985

## In My View

J. W. Williams Jr.  
*U.S. Navy (Ret.)*

Şükrü Elekdağ  
*Ambassador of the Turkish Republic*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Williams, J. W. Jr. and Elekdağ, Şükrü (1985) "In My View," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 38 : No. 2 , Article 10.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol38/iss2/10>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).



Ian Oliver

## IN MY VIEW . . .

### Cross Training

Sir,

I am appalled at the article "A Central Role for Naval Forces? . . . to Support the Land Battle" in the November-December 1984 *Naval War College Review*, not only for its content, but also that the War College saw fit to run it as the lead article.

The article unbelievably lightly passes off the devastating capability of the Soviet nuclear submarine forces, with the totally unwarranted assumption that "Shipping . . . was not significantly impaired, although this appeared to be more the result of a diffident Soviet submarine warfare campaign than in consequence of Allied ASW successes." Anyone who assumes that the Soviet submarine force, with its great number of nuclear attack submarines and surface-to-surface missile launching nuclear submarines, will conduct a "diffident" (Webster: timid, lacking in confidence) campaign, is guilty of absolutely unwarranted wishful thinking. Any conclusion as to the results of an imaginary war based on such wishful thinking is illogical, as well as terribly dangerous . . . .

In my opinion, should we engage in a nonnuclear war at sea with the USSR, in view of (1) the effectiveness of satellite tracking of afloat surface movements on the oceans, (2) instant satellite communications to and from submerged submarines, (3) effectiveness of submarine launched surface-to-surface missiles and sonar/wire-guided torpedoes, all high priority targets of both sides will be destroyed by the other side's nuclear submarines within the first weeks of the war. There will of course be some losses of nuclear submarines on both sides, but not enough to avoid elimination of all high priority surface targets. Certainly it is preposterous to assume "American aircraft carriers operating from within the Irish Sea could participate in the air defense of the United Kingdom."

My forty years of commissioned service included the senior course at the Naval War College, seventeen different commands, surface, subsurface and shore, one of which was temporary command of the Seventh Fleet at the height of the Vietnam campaign. During the past thirty years—I was Chief of Staff to ComSubLant when *Nautilus* first went to sea in 1955—it has been my distinct impression that many segments of our great Navy tend to play down, for one reason or another but often from lack of exposure to subsurface operations, the truly devastating capabilities of

nuclear submarines. It would seem things haven't changed much since I retired, for the author of this article, a 1310 officer [aviator], is from one of those segments.

To shift from the negative to the positive, this all suggests to me that our senior naval officers should have some degree of cross training in the various warfare specialties. And I can think of nowhere more appropriate than at the Naval War College.

Food for thought?

J.W. Williams, Jr.  
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

### A Sensitive Issue

Sir,

I would like to bring to your attention an article titled, "Iran and Iraq: An Overview" written by Commander Bennice Liner of the US Navy and published in the July-August 1984 edition of the *Naval War College Review*.

In his article, Commander Liner deals with the war between Iran and Iraq. While analyzing the reasons that led to this war, he refers to the "Kurds" living in these countries as "a source of friction." He also writes and I quote that "The Kurds are of the Sunni Muslim faith and form sizable minorities in Turkey, Iraq and Iran." He correctly states that there really has never been a state of "Kurdistan." On Map 4 of the article however, a "Kurdistan" is illustrated, parts of which cover some sections of the eastern territory of the Republic of Turkey.

Allow me to clarify that, first of all, as stipulated in the International Treaty of Lausanne dated July 24, 1923, there are no muslim minorities living in Turkey. Erroneously referred to by Commander Liner in his article as "Kurds living in Turkey" are, as a matter of fact, Turkish citizens who enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms provided by the Turkish Constitution . . . .

Second, the common borders of Turkey with Iran and Iraq are clearly delineated in accordance with border agreements and there exists no "Kurdistan" as illustrated in Map 4 of the said article.

These are highly sensitive issues as far as the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish nation are concerned. It is also common knowledge that power centers hostile both to Turkey and the United States are constantly trying to exploit these issues with the aim of destabilizing Turkey . . . .

Dr. Sükrü Elekdag  
Ambassador of the  
Turkish Republic